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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-3798 
______________ 
 
DANILO ANTONIO PINEDA-GONZALEZ, 
AKA Danilo P. Gonzalez, AKA. Danilo Pineda, 
AKA Danilo Gonzalez-Pineda, AKA Donila Pineda-Gonzalez, 
                 Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                         Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF 
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A216-430-404) 
Immigration Judge: Kyung Auh 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 21, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Danilo Antonio Pineda-Gonzalez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons set forth below, we will dismiss 
his petition in part and deny it in part. 
I 
Pineda-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 
2011 without inspection.  Following a conviction for driving while intoxicated in 2018, 
Pineda-Gonzalez was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed in removal 
proceedings.1  At the hearing, he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.     
Pineda-Gonzalez claimed that he was persecuted because he belongs to two 
particular social groups (“PSG”) and for his political opinion.  Specifically, he asserted 
that he is a member of the following PSGs: (a) persons “targeted by the gangs–and in 
particular, the MS-13 and the 18, for refusing to join and actively opposing joining the 
gangs” and (b) “the Pineda family—as the only male . . . member.”  AR 283.  He also 
argued that his resistance to the gangs was a political opinion.    
 
1 Pineda-Gonzalez argues, citing Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), that 
his NTA was defective because it did not include the date and time of the hearing and, as 
a result, the IJ lacked jurisdiction.  He, however, correctly concedes that this argument is 
foreclosed by Nkomo v. Att’y Gen., 930 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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In support of his request, Pineda-Gonzalez submitted documents about the 
presence of gangs in El Salvador and the government’s efforts to control them.2  He and 
his sister also testified.   
Pineda-Gonzalez testified that he lived in an area controlled by MS-13, and gang 
members threatened him when he refused their recruitment attempts.  He also explained 
that a rival gang controlled the town where his girlfriend lived.  He said that the rival 
gang also attempted to recruit him, but that his problems with that gang arose because a 
gang member wanted to date his girlfriend.     
Pineda-Gonzalez believed that MS-13 feared that he was giving the rival gang 
information about MS-13 and, as a result, the gang threatened him and told him to stop 
seeing his girlfriend.  While both gangs threatened him, neither physically harmed him.  
Nevertheless, he feared for his life.   
Pineda-Gonzalez testified that after he left El Salvador, two of his nephews were 
jailed because of their gang activity and he believes that his family is at a heightened risk 
of being targeted by gangs.  Pineda-Gonzalez explained that if he returned to El Salvador, 
he would be targeted by the gang because he is the only remaining male member of his 
extended family.  He conceded that he had not experienced threats based on his family’s 
involvement in the gang, but asserted that the gangs maintain control in El Salvador and 
that the police and the government will not help.     
 
2 He also submitted an affidavit from a psychologist.   
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Pineda-Gonzalez’s sister corroborated Pineda-Gonzalez’s testimony about their 
family’s involvement with the gangs.  In addition to confirming that two of his nephews 
were involved with MS-13 and incarcerated, she explained that one of their sisters, who 
remained in El Salvador, had been approached by a man she believed to be involved in 
the gang who asked whether Pineda-Gonzalez would be deported back to El Salvador.  
This led Pineda-Gonzalez’s sister to believe he would be in danger if returned to El 
Salvador,3 but she agreed that Pineda-Gonzalez had not received any recent threats from 
MS-13 and received no threats related to their nephews’ gang involvement.   
The IJ found Pineda-Gonzalez credible and, despite his counsel’s complaints 
about the interpreter, the translation of his testimony was accurate.  The IJ determined 
that Pineda-Gonzalez’s request for asylum was untimely and that he had not shown that 
any changed circumstances warranted an exception to the filing deadline.4  The IJ also 
held that, even if timely, his asylum application lacked merit because: (1) the PSG of 
persons “who ha[ve] been targeted by MS-13 and MS-18 gangs for refusing to join and 
actively opposing” was not cognizable because it was overly broad, AR 38; (2) even if 
the PSG of “member of the Pineda family, as the only male member,” was a cognizable 
 
3 She also noted that she and Pineda-Gonzalez were not aware of this event or 
their nephews’ involvement with the gang until after he was detained.   
4 Among other things, the IJ observed that, at the hearing, Pineda-Gonzalez 
explained that he had applied for asylum when he learned about his nephews’ gang 
involvement and incarceration and that this assertion was contradicted by his I-589 
application, where he explained that he failed to timely file an asylum application 
because he feared his application would be denied and that he would be deported.    
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PSG, and his gang resistance constituted a political opinion, he showed no nexus between 
that group and that opinion and the threats he received.  AR 39.  The IJ further reasoned 
that because Pineda-Gonzalez could not meet the higher burden for asylum, he could not 
meet the lower burden to obtain withholding of removal.    
The IJ also determined that Pineda-Gonzalez was not entitled to CAT relief 
because: (1) he presented no evidence that he had ever been harmed or threatened by the 
government of El Salvador; (2) he had not established that he would be “more likely than 
not” “subject to torture at the instigation, consent, or acquiescence of a public official,” 
AR 43; and (3) while El Salvador was experiencing instability as a result of criminal 
activity and gang violence, it also was “taking steps to target corrupt elements within its 
government” and “combat gangs and gang violence” as evidenced by Pineda-Gonzalez’s 
own testimony about the imprisonment of his nephews for gang activity, AR 44.    
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed the appeal.  The BIA agreed that 
the asylum petition was untimely and that Pineda-Gonzalez presented no extraordinary 
circumstances that would excuse the late filing.5  The BIA also agreed that Pineda-
Gonzalez “failed to carry his burden of proving past persecution, a reasonable likelihood 
of future persecution on a protected ground, or a clear probability that his life or freedom 
would be threatened on account of a protected ground if he were returned to El 
Salvador,” and that he failed to “establish a sufficient nexus between the harm[] feared 
 
5 The BIA concluded it did not need to address the IJ’s alternative merits-based 
ground for denying asylum.   
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and any cognizable particular social groups, his political opinion, or any other 
enumerated ground.”  AR 04-05.  The BIA also found no error in the IJ’s determination 
that he would not likely face torture if returned to El Salvador and thus was properly 
denied CAT relief.6  
Finally, the BIA found Pineda-Gonzalez’s due process arguments arising from his 
complaints about the interpreter “unavailing” because Pineda-Gonzalez’s hearing was 
“fundamentally fair,” the interpreter stood by her translation, and Pineda-Gonzalez did 
not identify any uncorrected errors.  AR 05-06.   
Pineda-Gonzalez petitions for review.7 
 
6 The BIA also held that remand was not necessary for Pineda-Gonzalez to 
reformulate his arguments about his membership in the family-based PSG in light of an 
intervening case, Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019), or that the IJ 
needed to explicitly apply S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 540 (3d Cir. 2018), 
because  Pineda-Gonzalez was “afforded full and fair consideration of his case in 
accordance with the applicable standards.”  AR 05.  
7 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  We review legal determinations de novo and “accept factual findings if 
supported by substantial evidence.”  Sesay v. Att’y Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 
2015).  Under the “deferential” substantial evidence standard, id., “findings of fact are 
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the 
contrary.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he BIA’s finding must be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a 
contrary conclusion, but compels it.”).   
Where, as here, “the BIA issued its own opinion, and did not simply adopt the 
opinion of the IJ, we review . . . the BIA’s decision as the final agency decision.”  Nelson 
v. Att’y Gen., 685 F.3d 318, 320-21 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Sarango v. Att’y Gen., 651 
F.3d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 2011)). “However, to the extent the BIA deferred to or adopted the 
IJ’s reasoning, we also look to and consider the decision of the IJ on those points.”  Id. at 
321 (citing Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
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II 
Because Pineda-Gonzalez asserts that his right to due process was violated, and 
because that claim, if successful, could require us to order a new hearing, we first address 
Pineda-Gonzalez’s due process claim. 
Due process requires that those in removal proceedings receive “the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 
F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  Where a petitioner claims he was 
deprived of his due process right, “he must show (1) that he was prevented from 
reasonably presenting his case and (2) that substantial prejudice resulted.”  Fadiga v. 
Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Khan v. Att’y Gen., 448 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2006).   
Pineda-Gonzalez identifies several aspects of his case that he argues violated his 
right to due process, the most significant of which is the alleged failure in translation.8  
 
8 Pineda-Gonzalez raises several other reasons why he believes his due process 
rights were violated, but none has merit.  First, the fact that various IJs handled 
preliminary proceedings did not impact his ability to present all evidence to the IJ who 
considered the merits of his applications.  Although certain submissions were temporarily 
missing, all documents were available when the IJ considered the merits of his requests 
for relief.  Second, Pineda-Gonzalez did not identify any evidence that demonstrates that 
his gastro-intestinal problems prevented him from ultimately presenting his case, and the 
fact that one hearing was postponed due to this health issue did not impact the IJ’s view 
of Pineda-Gonzalez, as reflected by his positive credibility finding.  Finally, because the 
IJ assumed Pineda-Gonzalez’s family constituted a PSG and denied him relief on nexus 
grounds, Pineda-Gonzalez was not prejudiced by the BIA’s decision not to remand the 
case for him to reformulate his PSG family membership arguments based on Matter of L-
E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019).  
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He asserts that the interpreter inaccurately translated and confused the two gangs about 
which he testified.  The IJ probed the errors and allowed his counsel to rephrase her 
questions and elicit responses.  In addition, the IJ questioned the interpreter to ensure that 
the translations were accurate and the interpreter assured the IJ that the translations were 
correct.  Pineda-Gonzalez points to no specific testimony that was mistranslated and 
proposes no alternative translations even though the proceedings were digitally recorded.  
Finally, even if there was confusion about the translation with respect to the two gangs, it 
resulted in no prejudice because his other testimony and written submissions 
demonstrated that, regardless of which gang he claims threatened him, he failed to show 
he was threatened based on a protected ground.9  See, e.g., Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 
527 F.3d 330, 340 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that “protected grounds” derive from the 
 
9 To the extent Pineda-Gonzalez argues that the interpreter’s frustration with 
challenges to the accuracy of her translation, use of her cell phone, and tight schedule 
prejudiced him, nothing in the record supports this assertion.  The interpreter’s 
scheduling constraints did not prevent him from fully presenting his case.  In fact, her 
scheduling issue only prevented the simultaneous translation of the IJ’s oral decision, 
which his counsel waived.    
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following categories: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion). 
As a result, Pineda-Gonzalez has not shown that the translation of the proceeding 
deprived him of due process. 
III 
A 
We now address Pineda-Gonzalez’s challenge to the ruling that his request for 
asylum was time-barred.  To the extent the ruling was based upon a factual 
determination, such as whether changed circumstances exist that support accepting an 
asylum application beyond the one-year deadline, we lack jurisdiction to review that 
ruling.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 188-90 (3d Cir. 
2007); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 633-35 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have 
jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and questions of law, but the only legal 
challenge he made was based upon due process and, for the reasons discussed above, 
10 
 
such a challenge lacks merit.10  Therefore, we will dismiss the petition to review the 
asylum ruling.  
IV 
We next address Pineda-Gonzalez’s argument that the IJ and BIA erred in denying 
his application for withholding of removal.  This argument fails.  First, although the IJ 
found that his asylum application was untimely, it also considered, in the alternative, 
whether he was entitled to asylum and determined that he was not.  The IJ then concluded 
that because Pineda-Gonzalez did not carry his burden of proof for asylum relief, he 
would be unable to meet the burden of proof for withholding of removal.  As we have 
observed, if a petitioner cannot meet the lower standard for obtaining asylum, then he 
cannot meet the higher burden for obtaining withholding of removal.  Guo v. Ashcroft, 
386 F.3d 556, 561 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Second, substantial evidence supports the finding that Pineda-Gonzalez was not 
persecuted on account of his membership in the PSG 11 of “the Pineda family—as the 
only male . . . member.”  AR 283.12  Even assuming that Pineda-Gonzalez’s family 
 
10 Because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that the asylum application was 
untimely, it was not required to address the IJ’s alternate ruling that Pineda-Gonzalez did 
not prove he was entitled to asylum. 
11 A protected PSG is “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable 
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in 
question.”  S.E.R.L., 894 F.3d at 540 (quoting In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 
(B.I.A. 2014)).    
12 Pineda-Gonzalez also argued before the IJ and BIA that he was a member of the 
PSG of persons “who ha[v]e been targeted by the gangs–and in particular, the MS-13 and 
the 18, for refusing to join and actively opposing joining the gangs.”  AR 283.  He does 
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qualified as a PSG, substantial evidence supports the IJ and BIA’s conclusion that the 
motive for the harm Pineda-Gonzalez fears is not his membership in this group.  See 
I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (requiring that the persecutor’s motive 
arise from the alien’s protected trait).  The record shows that Pineda-Gonzalez 
experienced recruitment by his local gang and came to the attention of a rival gang 
because of his romantic relationship.   Therefore, substantial evidence supports the 
conclusion that the harm Pineda-Gonzalez fears was based on his personal relationship 
and on the gangs’ recruitment goals, not his membership in a PSG.  See Gonzalez-
Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 685 (3d Cir. 2015) (“Conflicts of a personal nature 
and isolated criminal acts do not constitute persecution on account of a protected 
characteristic.”); Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that to satisfy this nexus requirement, an applicant must show that the protected ground is 
one central reason for the persecution).13 
 
not make an argument based upon this PSG in his opening brief, therefore any challenge 
to the IJ and BIA’s findings with respect to this group is waived.  Khan v. Att’y Gen., 
691 F.3d 488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that a party waives an issue on appeal 
when the party omitted it from its opening brief).  
13 Pineda-Gonzalez also argues that he was persecuted based on his opposition to 
the gang, which he claims embodies a political opinion.  Even assuming that gang 
opposition is a political opinion, the record shows that the gang targeted Pineda-Gonzalez 
because of his romantic relationship and one gang’s perception that he was providing 
information to its rival gang.  Thus, there was substantial evidence for the IJ’s conclusion 
that the threats he received were not on account of his opposition to gangs.  See 
Gonzalez-Posadas, 781 F.3d at 685. 
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V 
Finally, we review the decision to deny Pineda-Gonzalez CAT relief.  To qualify 
for protection under the CAT, the “burden of proof is on the applicant . . . to establish that 
it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured,”14 Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 
509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (first omission in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)), 
“with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or person acting in an official 
capacity,” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1),15 “if removed to the proposed country of removal,” 
Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515.   
Pineda-Gonzalez is not entitled to CAT relief.  First, the threats and intimidation 
he experienced do not constitute “extreme[,] . . . cruel and inhuman treatment,” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(2).  Second, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Pineda-
 
14 The “likelihood of torture” factor poses two questions: “(1) what is likely to 
happen to the petitioner if removed; and (2) does what is likely to happen amount to the 
legal definition of torture?”  Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
first question is factual, id., and requires the IJ to review “the evidence and determine[] 
future events more likely than not to occur,” Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516.  Because Pineda-
Gonzalez did not argue to the BIA that the IJ erred in not specifically reciting Myrie’s 
two-step analysis, he failed to exhaust this argument and so we lack jurisdiction to 
consider it.  See Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To exhaust 
a claim before the agency, an applicant must first raise the issue before the BIA or IJ, so 
as to give it the opportunity to resolve a controversy or correct its own errors before 
judicial intervention.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  In any event, the 
IJ and BIA applied Myrie principles. 
15 “For an act to constitute torture under the [CAT] . . . it must be: (1) an act 
causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally inflicted; (3) for an 
illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical control of the victim; and 
(5) not arising from lawful sanctions.”  Myrie, 855 F.3d at 515 (quoting Auguste v. 
Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005)).   
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Gonzalez did not show that he would suffer harm “by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official” if he returns to El Salvador.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(1).  Although there is evidence of criminal unrest, violence, and corruption in 
El Salvador, there is also evidence that the Salvadoran government has undertaken efforts 
to control the gangs and successfully punish illicit gang activity.  Indeed, Pineda-
Gonzalez’s own family members have been imprisoned for their involvement with gangs.  
Thus, the IJ and BIA correctly denied Pineda-Gonzalez CAT relief. 
VI 
 For these reasons, we will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.  
